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Version: v0.1.0-rc.1

2. The CryptOS profile for the VMCA subordinate

Before you start

The safety gate from stage 1 done. On the workstation: cryptosctl, openssl, and the Intermediate's bootstrap admin client credential (admin.crt, admin.key), as listed in the prerequisites.

The Intermediate signs the VMCA request under a CA profile. The profile decides every extension on the VMCA certificate. Only the subject comes from VMCA's request.

2.1 What vSphere requires of the VMCA signing certificate​

RequirementProfile setting
RSA key 2048 to 8192 bits. CryptOS refuses any RSA subject key below 3072, so the usable range is 3072 to 8192.The CSR from stage 3 is RSA-3072.
Signature SHA-2 RSA on every certificate in the chainthe Intermediate and Root hold RSA keys
basicConstraints = critical, CA:TRUEis_ca: true
No sub-CAs under VMCApath_len: 0
Certificate signing and CRL signingkey_usage: [digital_signature, cert_sign, crl_sign]
Extended key usage empty, or serverAuth onlyleave ext_key_usage unset
At most one DNS name, no wildcardsleave sans unset
Valid for the life you want, inside the Intermediate's validityvalidity_days (see 2.2)
Revocation pointers (optional for vSphere, wanted for your PKI)pki.revocation_base_url on the Intermediate

2.2 Choose the validity​

CryptOS computes the VMCA certificate's expiry as signing time + validity_days. If that runs past the Intermediate's own notAfter, the node shortens the certificate to end with the Intermediate and cryptosctl prints a WARNING:. With validity_policy: reject on the profile, it refuses to sign instead. Pick a value that ends before the Intermediate does, so the VMCA certificate gets the lifetime you chose. Check the Intermediate's expiry:

cryptosctl --endpoint 192.0.2.21:443 --identity admin.crt --identity-key admin.key --trust node-trust.pem \
  identity show -o pem > inter-chain.pem
openssl x509 -in inter-chain.pem -noout -subject -enddate
Expected output
subject=CN = Example Intermediate CA G1, ...
notAfter=Sep 21 12:00:00 2041 GMT

With 15 years left on the Intermediate, the tested run used validity_days: 3650 (10 years). The VMCA certificate expired in 2036, well inside the Intermediate's 2041. VMCA's own leaf certificates are much shorter (2 years for the machine SSL certificate and 5 years for ESXi hosts by default) and VMCA renews those itself.

(node-trust.pem is the Intermediate's pinned management certificate, or use root.pem. See 2.4.)

2.3 The profile snippet​

Add this to the pki.profiles list in the Intermediate's machine configuration. The surrounding keys are shown for context; keep your existing values for them.

pki:
  root_key_alg: RSA-4096                  # the Intermediate's own CA key; RSA-3072 also works
  revocation_base_url: http://pki-inter.example.org
  profiles:
    # ... your existing profiles ...
    - name: platform-sub-ca
      key_alg: RSA-3072                   # required by validation; governs keys this node
                                          # generates, not the VMCA key it certifies
      validity_days: 3650                 # must end before the Intermediate's notAfter
      basic_constraints:
        is_ca: true
        path_len: 0                       # VMCA may not create sub-CAs
      key_usage: [digital_signature, cert_sign, crl_sign]
      # ext_key_usage: leave unset (vSphere allows empty or server_auth only)
      # sans: leave unset (vSphere allows at most one DNS name on the VMCA certificate)

network:
  # ... your existing interface, address and gateway ...
  nameservers: [192.0.2.53, 192.0.2.54]   # must resolve pki-inter.example.org
  search: [example.org]

Notes on the fields:

  • key_usage accepts digital_signature, cert_sign, crl_sign, key_encipherment and key_agreement. Any other name fails validation.
  • path_len: 0 is the requested value. If the Intermediate's certificate is pathlen:1, the node's budget for a child is 0 anyway, so the result is pathlen:0 either way.
  • revocation_base_url stamps three pointers on every certificate the Intermediate signs: CRL distribution point http://pki-inter.example.org/crl, AIA OCSP http://pki-inter.example.org/ocsp, and AIA caIssuers http://pki-inter.example.org/ca.cer. A certificate signed without them cannot gain them later without being re-signed.
  • With revocation_base_url set, signing fails closed if the node's revocation preflight is not passing (the host does not resolve, or /crl, /ocsp or /ca.cer does not answer).
Do not bypass the revocation preflight

Do not set allow_unverified_revocation_url to get past this. Fix DNS instead.

2.4 Apply and verify​

Trust the Intermediate's management certificate. The Intermediate already has its CA, so its management listener presents a certificate signed by that CA, followed by the chain up to your Root. The key is new on every boot, but the chain is not.

Trust the Root instead of a pin

If you already have the Root certificate you distribute as root.pem (4.2), use --trust root.pem wherever this procedure says --trust node-trust.pem. It keeps working across reboots, so you can skip every re-pin below.

Otherwise pin the certificate itself. Fetch it after the node's most recent boot:

openssl s_client -connect 192.0.2.21:443 -servername 192.0.2.21 </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
  | openssl x509 -outform PEM > node-trust.pem
openssl x509 -in node-trust.pem -noout -subject -issuer -ext subjectAltName
Expected output

The issuer is the Intermediate CA, and the SANs are the node's IP, plus any names in pki.est.hostnames:

subject=CN = 192.0.2.21
issuer=CN = Example Intermediate CA G1, ...
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
    IP Address:192.0.2.21

Address the node by IP, or by a name in pki.est.hostnames. For any other name, add --server-name 192.0.2.21.

For readability, the rest of this procedure shortens the connection flags with a shell variable:

INTER='--endpoint 192.0.2.21:443 --identity admin.crt --identity-key admin.key --trust node-trust.pem'

Read, edit, apply.

config apply replaces the whole configuration

config apply replaces the whole configuration, so always start from what the node has:

cryptosctl $INTER config get > inter-config.yaml
cp inter-config.yaml inter-config.yaml.bak
# edit inter-config.yaml: add the platform-sub-ca profile (and revocation_base_url / nameservers if missing)
diff -u inter-config.yaml.bak inter-config.yaml
cryptosctl $INTER config apply -f inter-config.yaml

The diff must show only the lines you meant to add.

Expected output

Output of the apply when only a profile changed:

applied: generation=4 requires_reboot=false digest=5d2e...b7

Profiles are hot: requires_reboot=false. If the diff also added or changed revocation_base_url or network.nameservers, the apply reports requires_reboot=true. Those take effect at boot. Reboot the node gracefully, echoing its CA common name:

cryptosctl $INTER reboot --confirm "Example Intermediate CA G1"
Expected output
reboot accepted: the node is shutting down cleanly and rebooting

The node is back in about 10 seconds.

Re-pin node-trust.pem after every reboot

With a pinned node-trust.pem, re-pin after every reboot (repeat the openssl s_client fetch above), or every later call fails with x509: certificate signed by unknown authority. With --trust root.pem there is nothing to do.

If config apply prints WARNING: about revocation_base_url naming a host with no nameservers, add network.nameservers before going further.

Verify the node:

cryptosctl $INTER status
cryptosctl $INTER config get | grep -A12 'name: platform-sub-ca'
Expected output

Output of status:

Role:            INTERMEDIATE
Identity:        ESTABLISHED
TPM:             ...
etcd:            OK
Boot count:      3
Version:         ...
Revocation:      OK http://pki-inter.example.org (checked 2026-09-25T16:47:50Z)
DNS:             MACHINE_CONFIG 192.0.2.53, 192.0.2.54 (search example.org)

Verify the revocation endpoints from the workstation:

curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{content_type}\n' http://pki-inter.example.org/crl
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{content_type}\n' http://pki-inter.example.org/ca.cer
Expected output
200 application/pkix-crl
200 application/pkix-cert

Verify before continuing​

  • config get shows platform-sub-ca exactly as in 2.3.
  • validity_days ends before the Intermediate's notAfter.
  • status shows Revocation: OK with your base URL.
  • /crl and /ca.cer answer 200 from the workstation.
  • --trust is root.pem, or a node-trust.pem fetched after the node's latest boot.